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KEYNOTE ADDRESS: THE NEXT GREAT
GENERATION OF AMERICAN INDIAN LAW
JUDGES
KEVIN K. WASHBURN *
INTRODUCTION
Every American schoolboy knows that government in the
United States is a complex and elegant structure designed to
accomplish coordination between multiple states and one central government. 1 By high school or college, the student might
even know enough to identify the U.S. system as a federalist
structure. In school, students are taught to admire the people
who debated and developed this system. One would hope that
these students learn why some compromises were made along
the way, and perhaps, implicitly, that democratic government
is ultimately all about compromise.
When these students reach law school, they learn that the
basic structure of federalism and many other important constitutional questions are far more complex and somewhat more
ambiguous than they previously thought. In law school, the
simple and elegant structure that we once admired becomes
* Dean, University of New Mexico School of Law. The author is speaking
only on behalf of himself and not his institution. He wishes to thank Melody
McCoy and the Honorable William A. Fletcher for helpful comments on an earlier
draft of this address. The author also appreciates the research assistance of Julia
Maccini. The insights came from many, but the errors are the author’s alone.
This address was given as the keynote lecture at the University of Colorado Law
Review Symposium, titled “The Next Great Generation of American Indian Law
Judges,” on January 29, 2010.
1. Pardon the dated terminology, but the reference works better if we use
the same terms that Felix Cohen and the Supreme Court have used to explain
how simple certain concepts are. Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN.
L. REV. 28, 34 (1947) (“Every American schoolboy is taught to believe that the
lands of the United States were acquired by purchase or treaty from Britain,
Spain, France, Mexico, and Russia, and that for all the continental lands so purchased we paid about 50 million dollars out of the Federal Treasury.”); Tee-HitTon Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 289–90 (1955) (“Every American
schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of this continent were deprived of their
ancestral ranges by force and that, even when the Indians ceded millions of acres
by treaty in return for blankets, food and trinkets, it was not a sale but the conquerors’ will that deprived them of their land.”).
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much more complicated. However, law students learn that
there are basic constitutional interpretive approaches and values that can be used to navigate difficult questions. But even
today, most school children and law students learn very little
about Indian tribes.
By the time students learn about Indian tribes, they have
been taught repeatedly about the two sovereigns that exist as
part of the constitutional compact in the United States, and
they are perhaps inclined to be somewhat skeptical about the
existence of a third sovereign. The stated reaction might be
like this: “we have been learning about American forms of government since the second grade, so why are we just hearing
about tribes now?” We should not be surprised that people are
skeptical when first confronted with the longstanding, but not
widely taught, doctrine of tribal sovereignty.
Before I go any further, let me first congratulate the organizers of this conference on their poignant timing. Recently, I
met with an old mentor, Judge William C. Canby, Jr., of the
U.S. Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit. Because all of us
here at the conference would think of Judge Canby, for whom I
clerked, as one of the leading Indian law judges of the last generation, perhaps the question is, “how do we develop more
judges like him?” 2
Judge Canby’s example illustrates the task ahead of us.
The central challenge in Indian law is ensuring that Indian law
and Indian tribes are not some alien concept, but are a regular
part of the cultural and governmental background in the United States. To illuminate this thesis, I will proceed in three
ways with my time here today. First, I am going to speak a little about Judge Canby, who has been the greatest of the federal
judges of the prior generation on Indian law issues. 3 Second, I
wish to discuss a particular part of the challenge: we often
must wait a while to identify who among lawyers and judges
are likely to be most capable at successfully developing federal
Indian law. Here, I will discuss the changes seen over time in
rulings from judges who have come to be highly regarded in the
field of Indian law and explain the path and time it took them
2. I did not mention this event to Judge Canby because it would have embarrassed him to know that I would mention him in such a context. This kind of humility makes for a great human being, and perhaps an unusual federal judge, but
humility is not necessarily correlative with greatness. In Judge Canby, the two
qualities are simply a happy coincidence.
3. Judge Canby served roughly thirty years from 1980 to 2010.
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to get there. Finally, I am going to discuss how we can speed
this process up through education so we do not have to wait so
long for successful lawyers and judges familiar with federal Indian law to emerge.
I.

JUDGE CANBY AND THE LAST GREAT GENERATION OF
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW JUDGES

After thirty years on the federal bench, Judge Canby is
about to retire. Although he assumed senior status in 1996, he
continues to serve actively, carrying a nearly full load on the
court. The level of his service is about to decline precipitously.
When Judge Canby’s current set of judicial law clerks complete
their service in September 2010, he will have no more new
clerks joining him. Judge Canby will be moving to a much
more limited status and expects to be hearing cases only at the
request of the court. Though he is only 78 years old and still as
sharp as ever, he tells me that he has seen the debilitating effects of age on others, and he swore long ago that he would not
wait until those effects were apparent before he stepped down
because by then it would be too late.
Judge Canby’s path was unusual. He sought out the study
of Indian law on his own simply because he found it interesting
and challenging. His first exposure to Indian law occurred
when he was serving as a law clerk on the United States Supreme Court for Justice Charles Whitaker. The case was Williams v. Lee, 4 the path-breaking case that, as Charles Wilkinson famously argued, ushered in the great Modern Era in
American Indian law. 5 In Williams v. Lee, the Court held that
an Indian on the reservation could be sued by a person doing
business on the reservation only in tribal courts. 6 To the
Court, allowing suit in state court would infringe on the inherent sovereign right of Indian tribes to make their own laws
and be ruled by them.
A few years later, after a stint in the Peace Corps in Africa,
Judge Canby became a law professor at Arizona State University College of Law. Soon thereafter, he argued a First
Amendment case on lawyer advertising before the Supreme

358 U.S. 217 (1959).
See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW:
NATIVE SOCIETIES IN A MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 2 (1987).
6. 358 U.S. at 223.
4.
5.
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Court. 7 He also published important law review articles in the
area. 8 But in addition to his primary field of constitutional
law, he also turned his attention to the field of Indian law. 9
Thus, Williams v. Lee not only ushered in a new era, but it
ushered in a very important scholar.
In 1980, President Jimmy Carter moved Judge Canby out
of academia to the federal bench. Since that time, he has presided over many Indian law cases in front of the Ninth Circuit,
and his prior interest and background have made the outcome
of these cases more thoughtfully reasoned and drafted.
Judge Canby produces West’s Nutshell on American Indian law, now in its fifth edition, which remains the only student study aid of which I am aware that is regularly assigned
by law professors as a primary text. He has served as a national resource to judges and others. He also recently undertook a thankless assignment to author a difficult en banc opinion in the latest saga in the historic and ongoing litigation in
United States v. Washington. 10 The dispute had Indian tribes
on both sides of the “v.” It is very rare for a senior judge to author an en banc opinion in a circuit court. That he was asked
to do so in this historic decision was, I believe, a measure of the
esteem in which he is held by his colleagues, as was the fact
that the decision was unanimous.
Judge Canby is exceptional, and we have been so lucky to
have his work in the field for so many years. During my clerkship, I learned that Judge Canby is careful and cautious. He
has always embraced the realization that he is part of a much
broader judicial system that must work in sensible fashion.
That has made him different from many of his former academic
colleagues. In his opinions, and even in public remarks, he has
spent little time criticizing the doctrine as it has developed.
Perhaps it is his humility, but he has rarely criticized other
judges overtly. And where there is a poorly reasoned Supreme
Court case on point, he nevertheless feels firmly obliged to follow it. He has worked within the system, by and large, and he
has followed its rules.
7. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
8. E.g., William C. Canby, Jr., Programming in Response to the Community:
The Broadcast Consumer and the First Amendment, 55 TEX. L. REV. 67 (1976);
William C. Canby, Jr., The First Amendment and the State as Editor, 52 TEX. L.
REV. 1123 (1974).
9. See WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL (1981).
10. 593 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2010).
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Where Judge Canby has always found room to express his
own views has been in the interstices between the cases that
have already been decided. Those were the places where he
has felt most free to do justice as he saw fit. And in doing so,
he frequently forced the hand of the Supreme Court; indeed,
the Arizona State Law Journal once held an entire symposium
on cases in which Judge Canby’s opinions were reversed by the
Supreme Court. 11
Because Judge Canby is exceptional, it is a fool’s errand to
try to produce another like him. While we can hope that we see
another judge with his background and interest in Indian law
in our lifetime, we cannot count on such a scenario. So let us
set aside Judge Canby (or place him up on a pedestal) and proceed in a more realistic fashion. I will next discuss the education of federal judges, as I see it. Most federal judges come to
Indian law differently than Judge Canby. It seems more common for federal judges to become introduced to Indian law only
after they have taken the bench and to become adept at understanding it and applying it only after many years on the bench.
II. EXPERIENCED JUDGES ARE BEST AT INTERPRETING
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
In deference to the wonderfully optimistic spirit of Professor Wilkinson, let me begin with a very hopeful thesis, and one
that, I think, can be defended. My underlying assumption is
that the central challenge of Indian law is to ensure that the
rule of law is applied with full force in cases involving tribes. If
the United States lives up to its historic commitments to Indian tribes in federal treaties, laws, and the common law, Indian tribes will survive and thrive. It is my thesis that federal
judges tend to be more even-handed to Indian tribes once they
become seasoned in their positions.
Perhaps the first judge to exhibit this tendency was Chief
Justice John Marshall in his trilogy of decisions, Johnson v.
M’Intosh, 12 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 13 and Worcester v.
Georgia. 14 In Johnson, Chief Justice Marshall famously recognized the doctrine of “discovery,” as a proper legal fiction, and
11. Catherine Gage O’Grady, Tribute, Empathy and Perspective in Judging:
The Honorable William C. Canby, Jr., 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 4 (2001).
12. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
13. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
14. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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held that European nations had obtained title to Indian lands
in the Americas by merely claiming it. 15 Such a fiction obviously undermined any notion of pre-colonial tribal government. In
Cherokee Nation, however, Chief Justice Marshall described
the Cherokee people as “once numerous, powerful, and truly
independent” 16 and indicated that the Cherokee Nation had
remained “a distinct political society, separated from others,
capable of managing its own affairs and governing itself.”17
Indeed, somewhat contrary to Johnson, Chief Justice Marshall
recognized their “nationhood,” indicating that the Cherokee
“have been uniformly treated as a state from the settlement of
our country.” 18 By the time he decided Worcester, Chief Justice
Marshall’s thinking had evolved so much that he described the
Cherokee Nation as “a distinct community occupying its own
territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the
laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of
Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves.” 19 The authority of the federal courts was
weaker then, and the citizens of Georgia were not inclined to be
law-abiding. In the end, the legal principles provided by Chief
Justice Marshall were breached more often than obeyed, but
what is remarkable is this: each of Chief Justice Marshall’s legal opinions was more respectful toward Indian tribes than the
last. 20
Justice Stevens is a modern example. It is fair to say that
the jurisprudence of Justice Stevens grew more favorable to
tribes as his tenure on the bench progressed. Early on, he was
one of the least respected judges among practitioners in the
field. 21 But his almost accidental work in Montana v. United

15. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 572–77.
16. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 15.
17. Id. at 16.
18. Id.
19. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561.
20. For a description of the progression of Chief Justice Marshall’s Indian law
jurisprudence, see Philip Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism,
Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV.
381 (1993).
21. Robert J. Nordhaus et al., Revisiting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe:
Robert Nordhaus and Sovereign Indian Control over Natural Resources on Reservations, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 223, 269 (2003) (“Justice Stevens circulated a devastating opinion for the Tribe that rejected its power to tax. Basing any power to
tax on the power to exclude non-members from the reservation, Justice Stevens
concluded that the Tribe had lost that power by entering the leases with the oil
and gas companies. In this analysis, Stevens did not even need to reach the
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States has become a foundation of American Indian law doctrine. 22 In recent years, he has been the single most reliable
Justice in seeking to preserve the longstanding, though decreasingly forceful, federal legal norms that favor Indian tribes.
Perhaps the greatest illustration of this trajectory is in the
Oneida cases. 23 In Oneida County, Justice Stevens dissented
from a decision that saved centuries-old tribal property claims
in New York State. 24 Oneida County held that there was no
federal statute of limitations that would prevent the tribe from
raising its historic land claims. 25 Three decades later, the
Court adopted a much more adverse approach to tribal claims
in City of Sherrill. 26 Justice Stevens dissented there too, arguing that the decision departed from what were, by then, bedrock principles of Indian law. 27
Justice O’Connor also followed this trajectory, at least in
broad terms, before her retirement from the bench. 28 Her later
opinions, such as her decision in Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band
of Chippewa Indians, reflect a deep respect toward the federal
government’s historical commitments to the tribe and were
protective of tribal treaty rights. 29
Justice Ginsburg is another example. Despite an unfortunate beginning on the Court, the Indian law jurisprudence of
Justice Ginsburg has gradually become better, especially in the
last few terms. In an insightful article, Professor Carol Goldberg traces Justice Ginsburg’s development from Oklahoma

Commerce Clause issue, because the Tribe simply did not have the power to tax
and so the severance tax was invalid.”).
22. 450 U.S. 544 (1981). Strate v. A-1 Contractors called Montana the “pathmarking” case for the scope of tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on fee
lands within Indian reservations. 520 U.S. 438, 445 (1997).
23. Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
24. 470 U.S. at 255 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 253.
26. 544 U.S. at 222.
27. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
28. See Bryan H. Wildenthal, How the Ninth Circuit Overruled a Century of
Supreme Court Indian Jurisprudence—and Has So Far Gotten Away with It, 2008
MICH. ST. L. REV. 547, 587 (2008) (noting that Justice O’Connor was in the majority in the best recent decisions dealing with the Indian canons of construction).
29. 526 U.S. 172 (1999) (O’Connor, J., majority opinion) (holding that Tribes
retained certain hunting, fishing, and gathering rights on ceded lands); see also
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 397–401 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating
that she did not believe that the Court properly applied Montana v. United States,
450 U.S. 544 (1981), in its decision.).
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Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation, 30 her first Indian law
opinion for the Court, to her more recent positions in concurrences and dissents that are much more understanding of the
ramification of the importance of tribal sovereignty. 31
In Chickasaw Nation, the Tribe filed an action to stop Oklahoma from enforcing several state taxes against the Tribe
and its members. 32 Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of
the Court, which held that Oklahoma could not apply its motor
fuels tax, as currently designed, to fuel sold by the Tribe in Indian country; however, the Court explained how Oklahoma
could amend its law to shift the legal incidence of the tax so
that it would fall on the wholesaler who sold to the Tribe rather
than on the Tribe as the retailer. 33 The Court also held that
Oklahoma could tax the income of tribal members who work for
the Tribe but reside in the state outside Indian country. 34
Professor Goldberg offers insight on Justice Ginsburg, noting that Ginsburg could have decided the Chickasaw Nation
case either on fundamental Indian law principles or on fundamental tax law principles. 35 Because Justice Ginsburg subordinated the Indian law principles to the tax law principles, the
tribe lost. 36 It is unclear why she prioritized these two fields in
this way, but let me offer a hypothesis. By the time Justice
Ginsburg decided Chickasaw Nation, she had been married for
more than 40 years to a renowned expert in tax law. 37 I suspect that she may have learned a lot about tax law over the
years, if only during dinner table conversations. Back then, as
a relatively new Justice, she likely decided Chickasaw Nation
based on principles with which she was already comfortable.
By now, however, she has been on the Court for close to fifteen
years and seen her fair share of Indian law cases. Perhaps the
basic principles articulated in those cases no longer seem so
foreign to her. As she has grown more accustomed to these
principles, her opinions have become more favorable to tribes.

30. 515 U.S. 450 (1995).
31. Carole Goldberg, Finding the Way to Indian County: Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg’s Decisions in Indian Law Cases, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1003 (2009).
32. See 515 U.S. at 453.
33. Id. at 453, 460.
34. Id. at 453.
35. Goldberg, supra note 31, at 1018–22.
36. Id. at 1022.
37. Gardiner Harris, M.D. Ginsburg, 78, Dies: Lawyer and Tax Expert, N.Y.
TIMES, June 28, 2010, at B8.
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Indeed, she has recently issued some “[p]romising [d]issents”38
in Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation 39 and Plains
Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co. 40
One can find similar examples throughout the federal
bench. James A. Parker, a federal judge in New Mexico and an
appointee of President Reagan, recently ruled in favor of the
Ute Mountain Ute Tribe in a tax dispute with the State of New
Mexico. 41 The judge, who spent a career in practice in one of
the leading oil and gas law firms in the West before taking the
bench, had to distinguish the outcome of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico. 42 After a
careful, thorough, and thoughtful analysis of Cotton Petroleum,
the judge held that state severance taxes were invalid. 43 The
decision produced a significant benefit for the tribe. The tribe
had drafted its oil and gas contracts in such a way as to ensure
that if state taxation was found invalid, then the tribe would
capture that tax revenue rather than simply providing a windfall to the oil and gas company. 44 Although the decision could
fairly have been decided either way, it is doubtful that anyone
would have been surprised if the judge simply had dismissed
the tribe’s action summarily and cited Cotton Petroleum. Instead, the judge carefully read the words of Cotton Petroleum
and engaged in a very detailed analysis of the facts in the case,
ultimately concluding that the Cotton Petroleum prohibited
taxation on Indian lands when a state was providing absolutely
no services on those lands. 45
Admittedly, the research supporting this thesis is anecdotal. However, it suggests that Indian tribes in litigation would
generally prefer experienced federal judges to rookie federal
judges. Why is this? I believe that this pattern reflects a
process that everyone attending a legal symposium must necessarily appreciate: education. 46 While I could provide more
38. Goldberg, supra note 31, at 1032.
39. 546 U.S. 95 (2005).
40. 128 S. Ct. 2709 (2008).
41. Ute Mountain Ute Tribe v. Homans, No. CIV 07-772, slip op. at 62 (D.
N.M. Oct. 2, 2009).
42. 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
43. Ute Mountain, No. CIV 07-772, slip op. at 62.
44. Id. at 31.
45. Id. at 62.
46. Admittedly, other theories might explain this phenomenon. One is history. As we grow older, many of us tend to become more appreciative of history.
Because many claims of Indian tribes, and the most compelling equitable interests asserted by Indian tribes, are historical in nature, an appreciation of history
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and more examples, there are also exceptions. Still, this phenomenon happens often enough that those of us who love the
complex field of Indian law ought to seek to hasten the education and Indian law experience of judges and their understanding of Indian tribes.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF EDUCATION OF NON-INDIANS FOR
INDIAN TRIBES
I was once told an old Osage Indian proverb from Oklahoma, which goes “we are all ignorant, just about different
things.” The necessary education process for federal judges involves unlearning all the untruths or partial truths that most
Americans began learning in grade school. If Americans are
introduced to Indian tribes very early in their lives, their understanding will be different. As grownups, they will be less
likely to spend years being skeptical of the legitimacy of Indian
tribes when they first take the state or federal bench or join the
halls of state legislatures or Congress. We can improve the
rule of law in Indian law cases. Thus, we must work to hasten
the development of wisdom in judges and legislators, and indeed in all Americans, by introducing Indian tribes earlier in
the educational system.
Even today, many school children may not be learning
about what Justice O’Connor has called the “third” sovereigns. 47 We could quibble with her phrasing—in North America, Indian nations were chronologically the first 48 sovereigns—
but we all should appreciate the fact that Justice O’Connor
used the word “sovereign” to convey the notion that tribes are
on the same governmental plane occupied by the federal and
state governments. Indian tribes can, of course, cite numerous
laws and cases that recognize their “sovereign” status, but the
status is not fully understood.
probably, on balance, serves Indian tribes well. But see Russell Lawrence Barsh
& James Youngblood Henderson, The Betrayal: Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe and the Hunting of the Snark, 63 MINN. L. REV. 609 (1979) (criticizing William Rehnquist’s quasi-historical claims).
47. Sandra Day O’Connor, Remark, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian
Tribal Courts, 33 TULSA L.J. 1, 1 (1997).
48. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 542–43 (1832) (“[Prior to
European contact,] America, separated from Europe by a wide ocean, was inhabited by a distinct people, divided into separate nations, independent of each other
and of the rest of the world, having institutions of their own, and governing themselves by their own laws.”)
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The basic problem for Indian tribes is one of timing. Upon
learning about tribes, I suspect that many people have the
reaction, “well, this is a damned inconvenience.” The very existence of tribal governments undermines the elegant structure
of federalism that we have learned about since the time we
were second graders in school.
Moreover, undermining the aesthetic of the federal structure is only half of the problem. The existence of Indian tribes
also undermines the American system’s legitimacy in some
ways. Some ugly truths lurk within American history and it
would be a lot more difficult to infuse our children with patriotism and faith in American government if we led the discussion
with our country’s worst errors. I am not sure when we should
introduce such information, for we should not necessarily seek
to undermine the inculcative function of the schools regarding
the important American value known as “love of country.” But
truth is also an important value, and it must be introduced in
appropriate ways.
I think that it may take some citizens a long while to get
past the initial reaction that tribes are “a damned inconvenience.” Some people never get past the idea. The point of my
address today is that the task of identifying the next generation of great federal judges in Indian law is challenging because it requires repeatedly confronting a federal judge with
the existence of Indian tribal governments and then waiting,
over time, to see what happens. Many people never grow
beyond the elegant, though fictitious, worldview that developed
during their K–12 educations. Many judges, however, eventually develop an understanding of the existence of Indian tribes. 49 It is my experience that, if we give people the time to assimilate this information, we are often pleasantly surprised at
their ability to do so. If this is true, the question is how to
make that process happen sooner.
In the course of my career, I have seen several enterprising
teachers use what might be called “guerilla” tactics to introduce education about Indian tribes. For instance, I recently
met with the executive director of the New Mexico Center for
Civic Values, which runs the high school mock trial program in
New Mexico. She told me that mock trial teachers and coaches
in states that have Indian country within their borders have
occasionally used problems involving Indian law in their local
49.

See supra Part II.
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and national competitions. 50 This is a way of ensuring that, at
a relatively early age, several bright high-school students are
exposed to the governmental existence of Indian tribes, or at
least to principles of Indian law. Likewise, I have worked with
the Center for Civic Education, a federally funded annual program that runs a similar competition called “We the People,” in
which students participate in mock congressional hearings. 51 I
have consulted with this important organization on its high
school curricular materials in an effort to introduce the existence of Indian tribes earlier and in a more authoritative manner. 52
There have also been a variety of indirect efforts to teach
Indian Law at the law school level. For example, at the University of New Mexico, the Legal Research and Writing Instructors have routinely constructed the first year appellate
problem/moot court curriculum around an Indian law problem. 53 For a long time, this effort has ensured that students
who do not take Indian law in law school nevertheless are exposed to at least one substantive issue involving Indian tribes
and the law.
Other efforts have been much more direct. There are now
three states that test Indian law on the bar exam. 54 Including
Indian law on the bar exam is helpful in ensuring that the rule
of Indian law is enforced as strongly as the rule of law in contracts or property or torts. However, the bar exam may be too
late in the educational process to be very effective in a longterm manner.

50. Interview with Michelle Geiger, Executive Director, N.M. Ctr. for Civic
Values (Fall 2009).
51. Center for Civic Education, We the People: The Citizen and the Constitution: Introduction, http://www.civiced.org/index.php?page=wtp_introduction (last
visited Apr. 13, 2010).
52. See MARGARET S. BRANSON, ET AL., WE THE PEOPLE: THE CITIZEN AND
THE CONSTITUTION, at vi (2009). See also id. at 4, 139, 248–49.
53. Barbara P. Blumenfeld, Integrating Indian Law into a First Year Legal
Writing Course, 37 TULSA L. REV. 503 (1991).
54. Gloria Valencia-Weber, Indian Law on State Bar Exams: A Situational
Report, 54 FED. LAW., Mar.–Apr. 2007, at 26. (The three states which currently
include Indian law questions on their bar exams are New Mexico, Washington,
and South Dakota.).
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CONCLUSION
Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject
it merely because it comes late.
—Felix Frankfurter 55

Let us return to federal judges and the broader issue of
education. It is a reflection of the complexity and difficulty of
the field of Indian law that it takes so long for federal judges to
develop an approach that respects tribal governments. Now let
me offer the exception that proves the rule. You may be skeptical. There have been federal judges who loved history and
who were long on the bench, but who were nevertheless hostile
to the legal rights of Indian tribes and who have produced judicial opinions that have not withstood scrutiny very well. I admit that such judges exist. However, I am not surprised at the
views of these judges. I attended many of the same schools
that they did. They are not evil. I simply think that most of
these judges were wedded early in their lives to a constitutional vision of the United States that fundamentally omits the
complexities that Indian tribes create. In their defense, they
likely developed this misinformed vision through years of education in our public schools.
To put it a different way, if we want great federal judges in
this field, we ought to think about how to start building them
in second grade. Obviously, what I am suggesting here is that
we must lift up the entire country if we hope to develop better
federal judges in a consistent manner. My hope is that, if we
can change the K–12 educational system to be more accurate,
fewer people will become invested in an idealized and unreal
vision of government in the United States that actually does
not exist. For as theoretically elegant as the United States
constitutional structure is, it will never be practically elegant,
or practically real, until Indian tribes are honestly and properly accounted for in that system.
This means that we need not necessarily look to lawyers,
law schools, or even bar exams as the solution to the problem
that we have defined. We must work to support the people who
55. Henslee v. Union Planters Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595, 600
(1949) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting).
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are toiling to improve the curricular standards in K–12 education. In many states, these standards are improving in relation
to Indian tribes. As Melody McCoy has explained, at least five
states now explicitly require the teaching of tribal sovereignty
in some form in the public schools. 56 It is this kind of education, extending far beyond the courts, which will ultimately
best serve the field of Indian law. This approach also will best
serve the American people by creating understanding between
regular Americans and American Indians.
In sum, education is our best hope for creating the next
great generation of Indian law judges. We cannot hope for
another singularly powerful and talented judge like Judge
Canby. Rather, we must work to educate all Americans so that
each of them will be more sensitive to the important issues involved in Indian law.

56. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13040 (West 2010); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, §
4706(2) (2009); MONT. ADMIN. R. 10.54.6043(1)(h) (2010); OR. REV. STAT. §
329.007(8) (2009); WIS. STAT. § 121.02(1)(l) (2010).

